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Abstract: If a robot sends a deceptive signal to a human user, is this always and 
everywhere an unethical act, or might it sometimes be ethically desirable? Building upon 
previous work in robot ethics, this article tries to clarify and refine our understanding of the 
ethics of robotic deception. It does so by making three arguments. First, it argues that we 
need to distinguish between three main forms of robotic deception (external state deception; 
superficial state deception; and hidden state deception) in order to think clearly about its 
ethics. Second, it argues that the second type of deception – superficial state deception – is 
not best thought of as a form of deception, even though it is frequently criticised as such. And 
third, it argues that the third type of deception is best understood as a form of betrayal 
because doing so captures the unique ethical harm to which it gives rise, and justifies special 
ethical protections against its use. 
 
1. Introduction 
What should we do about deceptive robots? Since Alan Turing first defined the field of 
AI research in terms of the Imitation Game, there has been an uneasy relationship between 
reality and fakery in the design and operation of robots (Turing 1950; Gunkel 2018, 145-
150). This has become particularly problematic in the field of social robotics, where the use 
of anthropomorphic cues — up to and including deceptive cues — is thought to be integral to 
the project of building a socially acceptable robot (Wagner and Arkin 2011; Damiano and 
Dumouchel 2018; Isaac and Bridewell 2017). This has put some ethicists and social 
commentators on edge as they worry about the ethics of such robotic deception and implore 
engineers and policy makers to ensure greater transparency in the design and operation of 
social robots (Kaminsky et al 2017; Leong and Selinger 2019; Turkle 2007 & 2010). 
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There is, however, some confusion pervading this debate. There is a tendency to conflate 
the different kinds of deception and fakery that can arise, and to rush to judgment in both 
condemning and rationalising robotic deception. The purpose of this article is clear up some 
of this confusion and provide a more nuanced understanding of the ethics of robotic 
deception.  
 
It does so by making three main arguments. First, it argues that although there are many 
different forms that robotic deception can take, there are three general categories that must be 
distinguished in order to think clearly about its ethics: (i) external state deception; (ii) 
superficial state deception and (iii) hidden state deception. The first is practically significant 
but relatively uninteresting from a philosophical and ethical perspective; the other two are 
more philosophically significant. Second, it argues that superficial state deception is best 
interpreted through the lens of a philosophical theory — here called “ethical behaviourism” 
(Danaher 2019) — which significantly alters how we ought to think about it — specifically 
by implying that it is not really an ethically worrisome form of deception in most cases. And 
third, it argues that hidden state deception is the most ethically worrisome and is best 
understood as a form of betrayal. Indeed, applying the concept of betrayal to this category of 
deception not only offers the best insight into the unique harm it can cause to human-robot 
relations, but also helps to make a compelling case for special protections to be put in place to 
prevent it from arising.  
 
The article proceeds in four main stages. In the next section, I briefly review some of the 
existing contributions to the ethical debate about robotic deception. I follow this by defending 
the first argument regarding the three main categories of robotic deception. I then make the 
case for applying an “ethical behaviourist” lens to superficial state deception, before finally 
 3 
concluding by arguing that hidden state deception should be viewed as a form of betrayal. 
The end result is a ‘user’s guide’ to robotic deception, one that clarifies how best to think 
about it and signposts ethically sound practice in relation to the design and operation of 
deceptive robots. 
 
2. Who’s afraid of robotic deception? 
Let’s start by getting the lay of the land and by defining the concept of a robot. A robot 
can be defined as an embodied artificial agent, i.e. an artificial, computer-programmed, entity 
with the capacity to sense, process and act upon its surroundings (Gunkel 2019, Ch 1). So 
defined, robots are becoming more prevalent in our societies. They are being used to perform 
ethically high stakes actions in medical, military and automotive context, as well as more 
mundane actions in our homes and offices.  
 
I mentioned in the introduction that people are concerned about deception performed by 
such robots, but why so? The concept of deception will be defined in greater detail in the next 
section but, as a rough first pass, we can say that deception involves the use of signals or 
representations to convey a misleading or false impression. Usually the deception serves 
some purpose other than truth, one that is typically to the advantage of the deceiver and the 
disadvantage of the deceived, though sometimes deception can be mutually advantageous, as 
in the case of so-called “white lies”. Following this definition, we can say that robotic 
deception arises whenever a robot, as an embodied artificial agent, makes a representation or 
sends a signal that creates a misleading or false impression among those who interact with the 
robot. The signal/representation may be in the form of speech, behaviour or physical 
appearance.  There are three general trends one can observe in the literature about such 
robotic deception to date. 
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First, there are those who think that some robotic deception is tolerable, perhaps even 
necessary (Wagner and Arkin 2011; Wagner 2016; Shim and Arkin 2016; Isaac and 
Bridewell 2017). This is not surprising since it is the view that most people have of human 
deception. As a rule of thumb, we think that it is wrong to mislead others, but we also 
recognise that deception can serve a higher purpose that ethically justifies its use. For 
example, someone who lied to the Nazi authorities during WWII, to conceal the fact that they 
were harbouring Jews in their basement, would be viewed by most people as a moral hero, 
not a moral villain. If we want our robots to be ethical, it’s plausible to argue that we should 
both expect and demand that they do the same. In addition to this, psychologists and 
evolutionary biologists have long recognised that deception and concealment is at the core of 
social intelligence (Trivers 2011; Simler and Hanson 2018). Getting along with your peers 
sometimes demands that you are frugal with your true opinions, that you flatter and conceal 
what you really think. This helps build alliances and enable coordination. Honesty can be a 
virtue but not if it is unrelenting. Building upon this observation, several roboticists have 
argued that if we want to build social robots that are capable of integrating smoothly into 
human society (and that’s an “if” that we may wish to reconsider) we will have to equip them 
with some deceptive capacity (Wagner and Arkin 2011; Wagner 2016; Shim and Arkin 2016; 
Shaw 2015). This position has been endorsed by the robot ethicists Alistair Isaac and Will 
Bridewell (2017) who defend the view that robotic deception is acceptable whenever it serves 
some greater good, including the good of smooth social integration. All of these authors can 
draw support from recent research about the moral expectations people have about robotic 
agents. Studies by Malle et al (2015) and Voilkis et al (2016) have found that people do apply 
moral norms and rules to robotic agents, but that they tend to apply a more consequentialist 
(as opposed to deontological) set of expectations to robots than fellow humans. This could 
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mean that people will expect (and perhaps even demand) that robots lie if this serves the 
greater good. 
 
Second, there are those who are more sceptical and think that at least some forms of 
robotic deception need to be stamped out. The fears here primarily relate to the use of 
“dishonest anthropomorphism” in the design and operation of robots (Kaminsky et al 2017; 
Leong and Selinger 2019; Zawieska 2016). This refers to the tendency for robots to use 
anthropomorphic appearance and behaviour to ‘trick’ people into believing that they are 
human-like. Sherry Turkle (2007; 2010) has voiced particular concerns about this. She argues 
that simulated affect in social robots — e.g. robots that cry, laugh or express concern for their 
users —  is ethically dubious because it tricks people into thinking that there is some 
mutuality in the relationship they have with a robot when there really isn’t. She suggests that 
all intimate or caring relationships with robots that are initiated on the basis of such signals 
are illusory, and that while simulated thinking might be a genuine form of thinking, 
“simulated feeling is never feeling, simulated love is never love” (Turkle 2010, 4). Others 
have voiced similar concerns about the dangers of fake or counterfeit relationships between 
humans and robots (Elder 2015 & 2017; Sharkey and Sharkey 2010). 
 
Closely related to this is the fear articulated by Kaminsky et al (2017) about the use of 
anthropomorphic cues to conceal non-anthropomorphic capacities. To illustrate the fear, they 
give the example of a social robot with a pair of eyes that appears to look away from a user 
while actually using a concealed video camera to record what the user is doing. Brenda 
Leong and Evan Selinger (2019) build upon this and develop a detailed taxonomy of the 
different ways in which anthropomorphic cues can give misleading impressions of what a 
robot is really up to. They worry that such dishonest anthropomorphism can be leveraged by 
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malicious actors to surveil and manipulate humans in undesirable ways. In support of this, 
they point to studies from cognitive and social psychology that highlight how humans are 
automatically triggered into anthropomorphic modes of thought by the presence of human-
like features (a point also emphasised in Zawieska 2015). When in this automatic mode of 
thinking, humans have certain expectations about what their interlocutors are going to do. 
Robots can easily violate these expectations because of their concealed non-human-like 
capacities (e.g. the capacity to ‘see’ in infra-red). This makes humans more vulnerable and 
less able to safeguard themselves from malicious forms of deception. Consequently ethical 
rules and policy guidelines need to be crafted to protect humans from dishonest 
anthropomorphism. In particular, Leong and Selinger advocate for greater transparency in the 
design and operation of social robots, suggesting that robots should clearly signal to their 
human users what they are doing and how they may not be truly human like in their 
functioning. In this regard, Leong and Selinger tap into the widely expressed desire for 
greater transparency in how robots and AI more generally operates. This desire perhaps finds 
its most authoritative expression in the EU High Level Expert group’s principles for creating 
“trustworthy” AI (2019). It should be noted, however, that the desire for greater transparency 
is not only expressed in response to deception as it is defined here; sometimes transparency is 
desirable even when there is no representation or signal that creates a misleading or false 
impression, as in the case of discrimination or bias in robotic decision-making. 
 
Third, and finally, there are those who take a different view of dishonest 
anthropomorphism, suggesting that although there are ways in which it can be misused, it is 
important not to over-ascribe dishonesty to the use of anthropomorphic cues. This is an 
important view since, as noted in the introduction, ‘imitation’ is built into the foundational 
fabric of robotics. Luisa Damiano and Paul Dumouchel have defended one of the more 
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nuanced views on this matter (2018). In basic outline, Damiano and Dumouchel maintain that 
the criticisms of deceptive anthropomorphic signals in robots often rest on an misguided 
dualistic view of human mental capacities. In other words, they argue that the assumption 
made by critics like Turkle, is that in order for anthropomorphism to be honest the robot must 
have some inner mental state/capacity that matches its outward anthropomorphic cues. If a 
robot lacks the requisite inner mental state, then it is being dishonest. But this dualistic view 
is outdated and disconfirmed by embodied and relational theories of cognition. Following 
these theories, Damiano and Dumouchel argue that human emotions and affect are best 
understood as phenomena that facilitate coordinating relations between two or more agents. 
The anthropomorphic cues of emotion and affect provide information that enable the parties 
to effectively coordinate their behaviour. The “truth” or “falsity” of these cues depends on 
their pragmatic value within that coordinative relationship, not on the presence or absence of 
some inner mental state.  
 
Damiano and Dumouchel use this view to invert the logic of Leong and Selinger’s fears 
about the use of deceptive anthropomorphic cues. Far from worrying about the automatic 
mode of thinking and how it can be exploited, Damiano and Dumouchel argue that this 
automatic mode of thinking gives us reason to believe that pragmatic reliance on those cues is 
not dependent on false beliefs, and hence not really the basis for a form of deception. As they 
put it: 
 
“[Anthropmorphic cues] trigger immediate emotional reactions that do not need, or rest 
on, the complex process of interpretation which philosophy, psychology, and classic cognitive 
sciences postulate as necessary for a person to access others’ emotions. This affective 
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coordination bypasses theory of mind and folk psychology. Applied anthropomorphism does 
not require any false beliefs.”  
 
(Damiano and Dumouchel 2018, 7) 
 
Whether this is persuasive or not is something to which we shall return. For now, it is 
worth noting that this pragmatic approach to anthropomorphism quells some of the fears 
about dishonesty and deception, but not all. It implies that some uses of anthropomorphism 
are not really deceptive or dishonest, but others could still be, including the use of multiple 
cues to conceal ulterior motives, or the use of signals that are clearly and unambiguously 
false. 
 
In summary, there are three main trends to be observed in the current ethical debate about 
robotic deception. The first suggests that robotic deception can be ethically acceptable, 
possibly even necessary to the smooth social integration of robots. The second suggests that 
we should be very concerned about some forms of robotic deception, particularly, the 
dishonest use of anthropomorphic cues, and that we need to put in place safeguards to ensure 
honesty and transparecny in relation to the use of such cues. And the third, pushes back 
against this by arguing that some allegedly dishonest uses of anthropomorphic cues are not 
really dishonest at all.  
 
How are we to make sense of this? Who is right and who is wrong? To start answering 
those questions we need to clarify the concept of robotic deception. 
 
3. Three Forms of Robotic Deception 
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Deception is a complex phenomenon. In my initial gloss, I suggested that deception arises 
whenever signals or representations are used to create a false or misleading impression. This 
suffices for a first pass but the phenomenon is more complex than that and deserves greater 
scrutiny.  
 
Clarifying exactly what it means to say that someone is engaging in a deceptive act has 
been a professional preoccupation for generations of philosophers (Mahon 2015). Within 
philosophical circles, most of the debate centres on a definition of deception that requires 
several conditions to be satisfied simultaneously in order for an act to count as deceptive. 
Some of these conditions relate to the intentions, beliefs and desires of the deceiver, and 
some to the state of mind of the deceived, as well as the context of the deceptive statement. 
These definitions are useful but confusing when applied to robots. One reason for this is that 
one of the things that robots are alleged to be deceptive about is whether or not they have 
intentions, beliefs and desires. This suggests that if we want to understand robotic deception 
we’ll need to have the flexibility to go beyond the standard philosophical accounts.1 
 
A good place to start is with the account of robotic deception developed by Isaac and 
Bridewell (2017). Their account focuses on overt speech acts — statements, claims, 
directives and so on — that might be issued by a robot in conversation with a human. To 
illustrate, you might imagine the statements made by AI companions when they are prompted 
for responses by their human users through a natural language interface: “Hey Siri, what’s the 
weather like today?”, “Are there any good movies in the theatre at the moment?” and so 
                                                            
1 The philosophical obsession with consciously intended deception has been criticized by others. Robert Trivers, 
in his natural history of deception, points out that “If by deception we mean only consciously propagated 
deception—outright lies—then we miss the much larger category of unconscious deception, including active 
self-deception” (Trivers 2011, 3). This seems right and is the more appropriate approach to take when looking at 
robotic deception. 
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forth. The statement made in response is the speech act that is capable of deceiving the user 
by creating a false or misleading impression. 
 
But how does this happen? Isaac and Bridewell argue that conversations come with 
standing norms, i.e. a set of common expectations about the purpose of the conversation and 
the rules that the conversational partners have to follow when participating in that 
conversation. The linguistic philosopher Paul Grice developed one of the best-known 
accounts of such standing norms with his theory of conversational implicature and its 
associated maxims (Grice 1975). According to Grice, most human-to-human conversations 
are guided by maxims of quantity, quality, relation and manner. That is to say, speakers 
ordinarily try to be succinct and informative, to stay on topic, and to avoid obscurity or 
irrelevance.  All of these maxims serve the goal of truth telling. But conversations can be 
guided by other norms as well. In some contexts people want to be polite or build rapport. In 
those contexts, truth-telling might be subservient to other goals. This doesn’t mean that 
speakers are free to tell outright falsehoods, but they can be less focused on truth-telling than 
might otherwise be the case. Isaac and Bridewell give the example of a friend who asks you 
what you thought of their poem, to which you reply “you must have put a lot of work into it” 
(2018, 162). This is not exactly false, but not exactly true either. It is an evasion but one that 
is, according to Isaac and Bridewell within the “expected standards of conversation” and 
maintains the rapport with your friend (2017, 163). 
 
The critical point for Isaac and Bridewell is that deception arises when a speaker makes 
an utterance that violates the standing norms of the relevant conversation, and serves some 
other agenda in the process (i.e. some ulterior end). Since most conversations are governed 
by norms of truth-telling (as per Grice), the most obvious cases of deception involve 
 11 
statements that are false, but this is not the only form that deception can take. Isaac and 
Bridewell give the examples of paltering (distracting someone by uttering an irrelevant 
truth), bullshitting (demonstrating a reckless disregard for the truth) and pandering 
(bullshitting in order to flatter a specific audience) as other forms of deception.  
 
Whatever the truth value of the utterance in question, it will not count as a form of 
deception, according to Isaac and Bridewell, unless it serves some ulterior end. It is the 
presence of the ulterior end that turns the statement from an innocuous violation of the norms 
of conversation into something more ethically troubling. Nevertheless, and as should be clear 
from the previous section, Isaac and Bridewell are adamant that not all instances of deception 
are unethical: sometimes the ulterior end is ethically preferable and trumps the standing 
norms. This is why they think we should want robots to deceive us, at least in some cases. 
 
Isaac and Bridewell’s account is useful but incomplete. By focusing explicitly on speech 
acts, they overlook the dishonest anthropomorphism that some people find so disturbing. This 
form of deception involves the use of anthropomorphic cues (appearances and behaviours) to 
distract and mislead humans regarding the true nature and purpose of the robot. Prima facie, 
this is very similar to what Isaac and Bridewell are talking when they talk about deception 
since it involves a violation of the standing norms and expectations associated with 
anthropomorphism, and so it should be included in the discussion. It could well be, of course, 
that Isaac and Bridewell’s speech act-oriented theory can be extended to cover behavioural 
signals and body language — sometimes people talk about speech acts in these expansive 
terms — but it is best to be explicit about their inclusion rather than leaving it open to 
interpretation. That’s what I propose to do here.  
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The other feature of their account that requires some further discussion is the nature of the 
ulterior end that the deception serves. Isaac and Bridewell refer to these ulterior ends as 
‘goals’ and ‘motives’. One might think this is problematically mentalistic in the case of 
robots: can robots have such things? Isn’t that effectively what Turkle and others deny? 
Maybe, but there is nothing particularly outlandish or philosophically suspect in suggesting 
that a robot has a goal state that it is trying to achieve. Even the simplest algorithm can be 
described in such terms: it will have some output that it ‘aims’ to produce by following a 
series of steps. The more important question is: whose goals are these, really? It is possible, 
in the case of highly sophisticated and autonomous robots, that the goals belong to the robot 
themselves. A sophisticated robot may, for example, learn deceptive instrumental goals on its 
route to achieving some more general final goal — this is, indeed, a common story-telling 
motif in science fiction and a concern among those who worry about AI risk (Haggstrom 
2019; Bostrom 2014; Omuhundro 2008). In other cases, however, it is quite likely that the 
ulterior ends can be traced back to the goals of the original designers and manufacturers of 
the robot. Indeed, the presence of such third party deceptive goals seems to be the major 
concern that Kaminsky et al (2017) and Leong and Selinger (2019) have in mind when they 
talk about dishonest anthropomorphism.  
 
With this in mind, I propose the following account of robotic deception: 
 
Robotic Deception: Arises whenever a robot  (a) uses some signal (speech act; 
anthropomorphic cue) in a way that (b) violates the expectations/norms we usually associate 
with the use of such a signals (most commonly by using the signal in a way that is objectively 
false or misleading), where (c) this serves some ulterior end that can either be traced to the 
robot themselves or some third party. 
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The first two conditions in this definition relate to the content of the signal (i.e. what it is 
taken to be about) and its relationship to the broader normative context associated with such 
signals. The third condition relates to the purpose it serves. In combination, they give us a 
framework for thinking about the different varieties of robotic deception. In principle, there 
are many such varieties — indeed, the varieties of robotic deception could be as vast (if not 
vaster) than the varieties of human deception. Nevertheless, there are a few high-level 
categories of robotic deception that seem to be worth distinguishing for ethical purposes. 
 
These high-level categories emerge from the different possible contents of robotic 
deception — i.e. what the deceptive signals issued by the robots are about. Using the human 
case as an analogy, there would seem to be two things that a deceptive signal could be about. 
It could be about some state of affairs in the world that is external to the agent using the 
signal, e.g. a statement of historical fact or geographical fact. Or it could be about some 
feature of the agent themselves, e.g. a signal about their intentions, desires, capacities or 
identity. The latter category corresponds, roughly, to the form of deception previously 
described as “dishonest anthropomorphism” though it is broader and could include signals 
that are not obviously anthropomorphic. Looking at this second category in more detail it 
would seem that, in the case of robots, there are a couple of different forms it could take. A 
robot could, for example, signal that it has some capacity or internal state of mind that it 
actually lacks (this is what concerns Sherry Turkle about dishonest anthropomorphism) or it 
could be concealing the presence of some capacity or state that it actually has (this is what 
concerns Kaminsky et al and Leong and Selinger). This leads to the suggestion that there are 
three high-level forms that robotic deception can take: 
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External state deception: the robot uses a deceptive signal regarding some state of 
affairs in the world external to the robot. 
 
Superficial state deception: the robot uses a deceptive signal to suggest that it has 
some capacity or internal state that it actually lacks. 
 
Hidden state deception: the robot uses a deceptive signal to conceal or obscure the 
presence of some capacity or internal state that it actually has. 
 
External state deception is practically important. A medical diagnostics robot, for 
example, that gave a misleading impression of your health and well-being in order to tempt 
you into unnecessary medical treatment would be highly problematic. Nevertheless, there is 
nothing particularly philosophically or ethically unique about this form of robotic deception. 
Presumably, whatever ethical rules apply to humans who engage in external state deception 
should apply to robots as well. If it would be wrong for a human to deceive another human 
about the relevant external state, then it would be wrong for a robot to do the same. If it 
would be right for a human to do so, then it is not clear why a robot should be held to a 
different standard. This is, I suspect, true even if people have different moral expectations of 
robots, as the study from Malle et al (2015) suggests: the moral standards that apply to 
deception shouldn’t vary just because a robotic agent is the mediator of the deception. That 
said, issues could arise concerning who is responsible for the relevant deception (who 
determined the ulterior end?), and I will reconsider the claim that robots should not be held to 




The other two categories of robotic deception are more philosophically and ethically 
interesting. They are both more unique and troubling in the robotic case because of the 
disputes about the ontological status and nature of robots. These forms of deception seem to 
be what is most disturbing and unsettling to critics. These critics worry that robots violate the 
expectations and norms associated with human-like entities and thus can be exploited by 
malicious actors. These two forms of deception are, however, distinct and there has been an 
unfortunate tendency to conflate them in the debate to date (e.g. Leong and Selinger 2019, 
304). This is apparent in the tendency to lump them together into the general category of 
dishonest anthropomorphism. This is unfortunate because it is possible for a robot to engage 
in superficial state deception without engaging in hidden state deception, and vice versa. A 
robot might look away from you while using a hidden video camera or voice recorder, but 
this does not mean that its ‘eyes’ are not also capable of seeing you (i.e. it could have hidden 
state deception without superficial state deception). Similarly a robot could appear to look at 
you and yet not possess the capacity to ‘see’ anything (i.e. it could have superficial state 
deception without hidden state deception). It is also unfortunate because, as I will argue 
below, superficial state deception is not, in many cases, an ethically disturbing form of 
deception. It consequently does a disservice to the harmfulness of hidden state deception to 
treat them as equivalent. 
 
In addition to varying in terms of the content of the deceptive signals, robotic deception 
can also vary with respect to the ulterior ends it serves. There are many possible ends it could 
serve. Concealed spying that is facilitated through hidden state deception could serve the 
needs of corporations for marketing information or the needs of governments keen on 
identifying and preempting terrorism. It could also serve the needs of the robot itself, keen on 
masking its true intentions from its human interlocutors (cf Bostrom 2014 on the idea of the 
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“treacherous turn”). It is difficult to say anything abstract and useful about the high-level 
categories here, apart from the banal observation that some purposes will be benign, perhaps 
even beneficial, and others less so.  
 
All I will say is that, given the entangled relationship between robot goals and the goals 
of third parties that control and design the robot, it is always important to ask what might be 
called the ‘Cyrano de Bergerac’ question about robotic deception. The question is named in 
after the play by Edmond Rostand. In this play, the title character (Cyrano) helps a more 
attractive younger colleague (Christian) to woo a woman (Roxane) with whom he (Cyrano) is 
in love. He does this by writing letters on behalf of Christian and telling him what to do. The 
net result is that Roxane falls in love with a fiction, a version of Christian that does not really 
exist, and is a front for the intentions and desires of Cyrano. The ruse is only made known to 
Roxane when it is too late. There is a tragedy in this since she was in love with the person 
who wrote the letters, not the person who signalled them to her. She would have loved 
Cyrano if only he had not mediated his intentions and desires through the medium of 
Christian. The Cyrano de Bergerac question then is: whose motives do the robot’s signals 
really serve? Are we dealing with a benign-Cyrano, who we can trust and accept, or a 
malicious-Cyrano, who we cannot? That will be crucial to assessing the ethical status of all 
forms of robotic deception. 
 
4. An Ethical Behaviourist Approach to Superficial State Deception 
Let’s now focus on the specific sub-categories, starting with superficial state deception. 
The view I defend here is that this is typically not an ethically disturbing form of deception. 
Indeed, in most cases, it is not a form of deception at all. Superficial states can be incomplete 
or inconsistent, but not directly deceptive in and of themselves.  
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Reaching this conclusion is dependent on first accepting a theory concerning how we 
ought to interpret the superficial states of a robot, at least when we interpret these states from 
an ethical perspective. This theory can be called ‘ethical behaviourism’.2 According to this 
theory, the ethical status of our interactions with a robot can be determined by their external 
behavioural states and cues only, and not by anything else. This is an epistemic thesis 
concerning the warrant for our ethical beliefs, not a metaphysical or ontological thesis 
concerning the ultimate grounding for those beliefs. According to ethical behaviourism, if a 
robot appears to have certain capacity (or intention or emotion) as a result of its superficial 
behaviour and appearances, then you are warranted (possibly mandated) in believing that this 
capacity is genuine. In other words, if a robot appears to love you, or care for you, or have 
certain intentions towards you, you ought, ceteris paribus, to respond as if this is genuinely 
the case. There is no inner state that you need to seek to confirm this. This means that, 
contrary to what Sherry Turkle and like-minded critics might suppose, simulated feeling can 
be genuine feeling, not fake or dishonest feeling. Consequently, if ethical behaviourism is 
true, then superficial state deception is not, properly speaking, a form of deception at all. This 
is because superficial states provide the best epistemic warrant for believing in the presence 
of the relevant mental states or capacities, at least for ethical purposes. 
 
Why should someone accept ethical behaviourism? The simple answer is that behavioural 
cues are the most compelling evidence we have for the reality of certain capacities or inner 
states. There are two main reasons for this. The first is that the primary source of evidence we 
have for such things is our own first person experience, but this is inherently private and 
                                                            
2 This paper is not the first to defend this idea, though the theory has not always been explicitly named as it is in 
the main text. For similar arguments, see Neely 2014, Schwitzgebel and Garza 2015, and Danaher 2019a and 
2019b. Each of these authors suggests, either directly or indirectly, that the superficial signals of a robot should 
be taken seriously from an ethical perspective, at least under certain conditions. 
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problematic when it comes to assessing the ethical status of our interactions with others. I 
know my feelings for my partner are genuine because I personally feel them — I know the 
longing and desire I feel for her — but how does she know about them? She cannot directly 
access my inner mental states. She can only go by my external behaviour. If that behaviour is 
not consistent with my professed longing and desire, she will be epistemically warranted in 
believing that I am not being genuine. She has to use that behaviour to reach an informed 
conclusion about the ethical status of our interactions. This is, of course, a familiar thought. It 
is at the heart of Turing’s famous test for machine intelligence. Ethical behaviourism is 
simply an application of this to the ethical domain. 
 
The second reason for endorsing ethical behaviourism is that other alleged evidential 
bases for assessing the ethical status of our relationships do not override or undermine the 
behavioural ones. For example, some people might argue that we should use the biological 
constitution of an entity to determine the ethical status of our interactions with that entity. If 
the entity is made from biological tissues and organs, then its behavioural cues have an 
ethical significance they would otherwise lack: a whimpering dog is genuinely expressing its 
feelings; a whimpering robot is not. But really there is no reason to think that evidence 
concerning biological constitution should trump or undermine behavioural evidence, at least 
if that behavioural evidence is consistent and complete. In other words, if a robot consistently 
acts in a way that suggests its whimpering is genuine then there is no reason to deny it an 
ethical significance that is granted to the dog, apart from an unjustifiable fealty to biology. In 
ethics, we have to err on the side of caution, of over-inclusivity not under-inclusivity, when it 
comes to determining to whom we owe duties and we ought to do (Neely 2014; Sebo 2018).  
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Similarly, some people might argue that the presence of a brain, with certain functional 
patterns of activity, is essential to determining the ethical status of superficial cues. If an 
entity lacks a brain, then its superficial cues, no matter how sophisticated, lack an ethical 
significance they would otherwise have. But, again, there is no reason to think that the 
presence of a brain should play such a decisive role in our ethical assessments. For one thing, 
there is at least some ambiguity here as to what would count as a brain for ethical purposes. 
Must an ethically significant brain be made of neurons and glial cells? If so, then we run into 
the previous problem concerning biological constitution. If not — if all it must do is be 
functionally equivalent to a biological brain — then we run into another familiar problem: 
functional brains look to be multiply realisable and could be present in a robot.  
 
This, however, does not suffice to defend ethical behaviourism. After all, it could be that 
some people are convinced that the presence of a multiply-realisable, functionally-equivalent 
brain is necessary for us to conclude that a superficial state is a genuine expression of mental 
capacity. The response to this is that it is not clear why the presence or absence of a 
functional equivalent to the brain should play an ethically decisive role. Consider the case of 
a hydroencephalic person who lacks much of the brain tissue of an ordinary human being. If 
we look inside this person’s head, we can immediately confirm this. But, from a behavioural 
perspective, this person is essentially no different (or not substantially different) from a 
‘normal’ adult human. Such people really exist. Do we deny the ethical significance of their 
behavioural cues because they lack a lot of the brain tissue a ‘normal’ human has? 
Presumably not — presumably we think their signalled feelings and intentions are every bit 
as honest and genuine as those of other human beings. But now imagine if it turned out that 
they lacked brain tissue altogether and yet still looked and acted like a normal adult. What 
would happen then? You might say such a person would be metaphysically impossible, and 
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maybe that is the case, but they do appear to be epistemically conceivable and when we 
conceive of them it is difficult to see why we would deny ethical significance to their 
behaviours purely because they lacked a brain. This observation carries some epistemic 
weight, even if it is metaphysically uncertain because given this metaphysical uncertainty as 
to whether other features (e.g. brains and biology) really matter from an ethical perspective, 
there is no reason not to treat behavioural cues as the most compelling basis for determining 
the ethical significance of our interactions with others. 
 
It is important that this position is not misunderstood. Ethical behaviourism is an 
epistemic thesis, not a metaphysical one. Its claim is not that capacities and mental states can 
be ontologically reduced to behavioural cues (a position once defended by logical 
behaviourists in the philosophy of mind — see Graham 2015). Ethical behaviourism is 
strictly agnostic on the broader metaphysical questions: it just claims that when it comes to 
determining the genuineness of capacities and mental states, superficial cues are the most 
compelling evidence we have.3  
 
This also does not mean that it is impossible to be misled or get the wrong impression of 
what a robot is capable of doing on the basis of superficial states. It most certainly is. 
Painting a pair of eyes onto a robot should not convince you that the robot can ‘see’ you. A 
more thorough investigation of its behavioural repertoire (a larger set of superficial cues) will 
                                                            
3 Ethical behaviourism is also consistent with, but distinct from, the science of machine behaviour that Rahwan 
et al (2019) advocate. Rahwan et al’s article make a plea for scientists to study how machines behave and 
interact human beings using the tools of behavioural science. In making this plea, they highlight a tendency to 
focus too much on the engineering details (how the robot/AI was designed and programmed) in the current 
literature. The result of this is that an important aspect of how machines work and the behavioural patterns they 
exhibit is being overlooked. I fully support their programme and the stance advocated in this article agrees with 
them insofar as (a) the behavioural perspective on robots does seem to be overlooked or downplayed in the 
current debate and (b) there is a significance to machine behaviour that is independent from the mechanical and 
computational details of their operation. Nevertheless, despite my sympathy for their programme, I would 
emphasize that ethical behaviourism is not intended to be part of a science of machine behaviour. It is a claim 
about the kinds of evidence we can use to warrant our ethical attitudes toward machines. 
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be required for that. Can it describe how you look? Can it talk about the colours or fabrics 
you are wearing? Does its gaze follow you around the room? Does it act in other ways that 
suggest it sees where you are and what you are doing? And so on. The genuineness of a 
capacity or mental state depends on both the richness of the set of superficial states from 
which you infer its presence (its completeness) and its consistency. A robot that signals some 
affection for its human user on some occasions, but on other occasions does things that are 
contrary to the interests and well-being of that human, may be a false friend or conniving 
companion. But this is not because the robot lacks some relevant inner capacity that 
undergirds its superficial states but because it is inconsistent in its behavioural repertoire. 
Similarly, a robot that signals some forms of affection, but does not perform all the acts of 
care and affection that we usually associate with human friends and companions, may lack a 
full human-level capacity or mental state. This does mean that its affection is false or 
deceptive; it just means that it is incomplete or unsophisticated.  
 
It is important to bear in mind the need for completeness and consistency in assessing the 
significance of a superficial signal. People may get the wrong impression or jump hastily to 
conclusions about what a robot is or is not capable of, and it is possible that a malicious actor 
could take advantage of this tendency (as we will see below) but in the absence of evidence 
for a hidden capacity or state, this is always to be assessed by checking other superficial 
states, not by assuming the absence of some underlying inner state.  
 
It’s worth reflecting on whether this ethical behaviourist model is similar to the 
embodied-relational model favoured by Damiano and Dumouchel (discussed earlier). There 
is certainly overlap between the two positions. Both agree that the Turkle-style condemnation 
of simulated feeling and affect is misguided: there is no epistemically accessible underlying 
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mental state against which we can assess the veracity of a superficial signal; the superficial 
signals are the most compelling thing we have to go on. Nevertheless, there are some 
differences. The Damiano and Dumouchel view flirts with a form of non-cognitivism about 
cognitive states and capacities, suggesting that the ontological status of anthropomorphic cues 
is determined by their pragmatic value within the human-robot relationship. If they are useful 
and help the parties to coordinate with one another, then we go with that and assume they are 
genuine. If not, we might need to reassess. The ethical behaviourist view is more explicitly 
cognitivist in nature, arguing that the ascription of capacities and mental states to robots can 
be more or less correct, depending on how complete and consistent the relevant set of 
behavioural cues is. Furthermore, the ethical behaviourist view is ethically-oriented, not 
ontologically or metaphysically-oriented: it is about assessing the ethical status of our 
interactions with robots, not about making claims about the true nature of cognitive capacities 
and mental states. 
 
If the ethical behaviourist view is correct, it has a number of significant implications. The 
most immediate is that it supports the conclusion I wish to defend I here, namely that: 
superficial state deception is not typically best described as deception at all. To be more 
precise, the conclusion it supports is that the use of an anthropomorphic cue or signal by a 
robot is not deceptive or false merely because it comes from a robot. By itself the superficial 
signal does not violate any expectations or norms we associate with that signal. It is only 
deceptive if the signal is inconsistent with other cues and signals for which we acquire 
evidence. This has another significant implication. It means that many of the relationships 
and connections we have with robots can be genuine sources of meaning and value purely in 
virtue of their superficial properties. Robots can be genuine friends and companions if they 
consistently and completely signal this to their human users. This means that our interactions 
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with robots have an axiological richness to them that is often denied by critics of dishonest 
anthropomorphism.  
 
None of this, however, implies that we only need to care about surface appearances when 
it comes to understanding robotic deception. A superficial state could be genuine (in the 
sense it genuinely signals the presence of some capacity or mental state) but could also be 
used to conceal some other capacity or mental state. This is what happens in the case of 
hidden state deception and it is to that that we now turn. 
 
5. Hidden State Deception and Robotic Betrayal 
Hidden state deception is a serious matter. If a robot uses some superficial signal to 
conceal or misdirect attention away from some capacity or function that it actually has, then 
this is prima facie morally concerning. Go back to the example from Kaminsky et al (2017) 
discussed earlier in this article: the robot that averts its eyes and continues to record activities 
using a concealed video camera. This practice is undeniably deceptive because it violates the 
expectations and norms we ordinarily associate with the superficial signal. Whether it is an 
ethically disturbing form of deception depends on the ulterior motive this concealment 
serves. As a general rule of thumb, Isaac and Bridewell’s principle would seem to be apposite 
in these cases: if the ulterior motive serves some greater good then it may be ethically 
permissible, otherwise it is not. It would be hard to appeal to the greater good in the case of a 
corporation mining consumer behaviour for marketing insights, but perhaps more feasible in 
the case of a government trying to predict the next terrorist attack (though, of course, all the 
standard arguments and objections to this practice of governmental surveillance in non-
robotic cases would still apply and need to be considered). 
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It is tempting to leave the matter there. But that might be a mistake. Taking onboard the 
implications of the previous argument, a case can be made for thinking that stricter rules 
should apply to the use of hidden state deception by robots, particularly by social robots, and 
particularly where the hidden state deception is contrary to the interests of the robot’s primary 
users. This is because the use of such deception is often best understood as a form of betrayal 
(‘bot betrayal’). Understanding it in these terms allows us to capture the special ethical harm 
that is involved when a social robot conceals its capacities from its human users, and allows 
us to invoke special ethical protections against such betrayal tactics. To make this case more 
compelling, I’m first going to present a theoretical account of betrayal and then explain how 
it applies to the case of hidden state deception. 
 
The theoretical account comes from Avishai Margalit (2017). Like much of Margalit’s 
work, it hinges on the importance of a distinction between thin relations and thick relations in 
human life. Margalit doesn’t offer precise definitions of these concepts — though he does say 
that “[u]sing “thick” as an attribute of human relations is a figurative extension of “thick” as 
physically dense, like trees in a thick forest” (Margalit 2017, 52). He prefers instead to 
illustrate what they mean by describing some paradigmatic forms. A paradigmatic form of a 
thin relation would be a market exchange, based on rules of contract. Such a relation is 
governed by some basic moral and legal rules, but the moral commitments are minimal: it is 
intended to be a mutually beneficial exchange of limited form and duration (specified by the 
terms of the contract). Contrast that with the paradigmatic forms of a thick relation: the 
relations between family and friends. These are governed by a more comprehensive set of 
ethical norms and rules. They are not limited in duration or intended to serve a particular 
purpose. They might be mutually beneficial — in the sense that people ‘get’ something out of 
these relations — but they are not primarily thought of or conceived in these terms. The 
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parties to a thick relation are bound together by what Margalit refers to as “glue”. In the 
paradigmatic case, this glue involves a shared sense of belonging, shared history/memory and 
shared meaning (Margalit 2017, ch 3). In other words, the parties to the thick relation will 
feel at home with one another, will be characters in a shared narrative, and will find that this 
narrative gives them a sense of meaning and purpose. 
 
According to Margalit “thick relations are the relations we care most about” (2017, 53). 
They have a special place in our lives and so are governed by special duties and ethical 
protections. In particular, they are governed by duties of loyalty and obligations of trust: the 
parties to the relation must protect one another’s interests and trust one another not to work 
against those interests.  
 
Betrayal is the ‘ungluing’ of thick relations (2017, 47). Anything that gives people good 
reason to reevaluate the meaning of a thick relation can amount to betrayal (2017, 88-94). 
This means betrayal can take many forms, but one of the most common is when the betrayer 
sends false and misleading signals to the betrayed that convince the betrayed of the thickness 
of their relation, while at the same time saying and doing things that are contrary to the 
interests of that thick relation. To put it another way, one of the most common forms of 
betrayal is facilitated by hidden state deception. In the paradigmatic case, this will involve the 
betrayer saying and doing things with a third party that undermines the relationship they have 
with the betrayed (e.g. betraying a spouse by having an affair). As Margalit puts it “[b]etrayal 
is a ternary relation. Betrayal in its paradigmatic cases involves a third party on top of the 
betrayer and the betrayed” (2017, 70). 
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When it comes to the ethical assessment of betrayal there are easy cases and hard cases. 
The easy cases arise when the act of betrayal serves no positive end and would, in and of 
itself, be morally impermissible. Consider the French national who betrays their nation by 
facilitating the Nazi occupation and extermination of the Jews. We might think of what they 
did as an unethical act of national betrayal, but it was also deeply immoral. We do not pause 
to condemn it. The ethical demands of the thick relation pull in the same direction as the 
broader moral demands. The harder cases arise when there is some tension between the duties 
of loyalty within the thick relation and broader moral demands or civic duties. If your best 
friend confessed that they had an extra-marital affair, or if your son committed some petty act 
of vandalism, you might feel ethically torn about whether to stay loyal or give them up. In at 
least some such cases, the ethical thing to do might be to allow the demands of the thick 
relation to take precedence. Certainly most of us act this way on a daily basis: we are partial 
to our thick relations and favour them over our thin relations in most cases of conflict. 
 
So how does this shed light on the problem of hidden state deception in robots? The 
argument is as follows. If human-robot relations belong to the world of thin relations, then 
the duties of loyalty and trust we can expect within those relations will be relatively minimal, 
largely to be set by contract and user agreement. Even if the duties specified by contract are 
strict they can be easily overridden by other moral considerations and interests.4 If, on the 
other hand, human-robot relations belong to the world of thick relations, then special duties 
of loyalty apply. The use of hidden state deception (as long as it undermines the thick 
relation) is an act of betrayal and takes on a special ethical significance. It is not so easy to 
override this duty of loyalty by appealing to other moral considerations and interests. 
 
                                                            
4 Easily overridden by other moral considerations, that is. They might still legally amount to a breach of 
contract. 
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The position being defended here is that, at least on some occasions, human-robot 
relations should be thought of as thick relations. There are several reasons for this. One 
obvious reason is that certain social robots are marketed and intended to serve in the role of 
thick relations. Robot companions, friends and carers, for example, are designed to take on a 
special significance in the lives of their users. They are intended to use anthropomorphic cues 
to encourage social acceptance and integration. The designers and manufacturers of such 
devices should not be allowed to shirk the duties of loyalty that are integral to thick relations 
simply on the grounds that the devices are robots. Second, although human family and friends 
are the paradigmatic cases of thick relations, there is some ‘constructive flexibility’ to the 
concept. Anything that creates the ‘glue’ that is the special marker of thick relations — 
shared narrative history, shared meaning and a sense of belonging — can help to create a 
thick relation. The claim here is that robots, by being integrated into our lives, by sharing 
moments with us, by reacting to us, laughing with us and helping us out, can create that glue. 
This may not be true for all robots, of course. Some robots may remain strictly in the world 
of thin relations (e.g. the autonomous vehicle or the robot barista that makes your coffee at 
your local coffee shop), but this does not mean some robots cannot enter the realm of thick 
relations. When they do, the use of hidden state deception will amount to a betrayal of that 
relation. 
 
The advantage of taking this view of human-robot relations is that it allows us to explain 
the unique harm involved in acts of bot betrayal and to invoke the special ethical protections 
we expect in thick relations. What, after all, is so disturbing about hidden state deception in 
the general case? Why would it be especially wrong for a government or company to use an 
anthropomorphic robot to engage in concealed spying? Don’t they do that to us anyway 
through other, non-robotic, digital technologies? Without commenting on the ethical 
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propriety of those other acts of digital spying, we can now say that there is something 
especially disturbing about the use of hidden state deception in the robotic case. The use of 
the superficial cues of friendship and companionship builds the glue that is needed for a thick 
relation and thereby builds up the ethical expectations and demands we associate with thick 
relations. The use of hidden state deception unglues the thick relation. It is consequently more 
ethically disquieting than in cases where the glue has not been built. This vindicates the need 
for special forms of transparency and trust building in human-robot relations. 
 
Many people will object to this. Margalit himself might object to it5 — at one point he 
suggests that thick relations are uniquely human affairs (2017, 65). If so, this is presumably 
because he believes robots don’t have the capacities needed to build up thick relations with 
human users. In this sense, Margalit might share the suspicion voiced by critics of superficial 
state deception. He might believe there is something illusory or fake about the relations we 
have with robots. But the argument in the previous section should call that suspicion into 
question. If that previous argument is right, then robots can have the capacities needed to 
build thick relations with humans purely on the basis of superficial states. There is, 
consequently, an irony to the view being defended here. We can say that there is something 
especially disturbing about hidden state deception in the robotic case, something that 
demands special ethical protection, but only if we accept that superficial states by themselves 
are not deceptive. If we assume that they are, and that all human-robot relations are fake, then 
we cannot easily explain the unique harm involved in acts of robot betrayal. 
 
Others might object on the grounds that we have different ethical norms or expectations 
of robots. I mentioned earlier the studies by Malle et al (2015) and Voilkis et al (2016) that 
                                                            
5 He also might not. He doesn’t discuss the issue at all. 
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suggest that people expect to abide by a more utilitarian ethical code than humans. Someone 
could appeal to such studies and argue that they suggest that robots will held to the duties of 
loyalty expected in thick relations. There are two things to be said in response to this. First, 
the studies by Malle et al and Voilkis et al focus on how people assess the actions of robots in 
trolley-style dilemmas. These are a unique set of cases and do not involve close robot 
companions making decisions about their owners or primary users. The results of these 
studies thus might not extrapolate to the world of close robot companions. Second, even if 
they did, these studies are descriptive only: they are about the attitudes people have and not 
the attitudes they ought to have. The argument I am making here is a normative one. It is 
saying that if robots are marketed as, designed as, or function in the world of thick relations, 
then they ought to be held to the duty of loyalty we normatively demand of thick relations. 
 
Let me wrap up this argument with two final comments. First, note that the argument 
developed here doesn’t apply only to hidden state deception. It could also apply to external 
state deception. Hidden state deception is more likely to undermine a thick relation since it 
means that the robot is deceiving you about its own capacities and how they are, or are not, 
directed towards you. Nevertheless, it is possible that certain forms of external state 
deception will do the same. If a robot companion constantly misdirects you or gives bad 
advice, for example, you might come to question the thickness of the relationship you have 
with it. What’s more likely, however, is that we will expect robots to engage in some acts of 
external state deception on our behalf, in order to keep the thick relation glued together. This 
too follows from the concept of a thick relation: sometimes the interests of the thick relation 
will be served by deceptive signals being sent to others outside of that relationship. Consider 
the father who conceals the truth on behalf of his vandalistic son. This does, however, give 
rise to another problem: with whom should a robot be deemed to be in a thick relation? Could 
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the original manufacturers and owners argue that they are the ones in the thick relation with 
the robot and so it is okay if the robot deceives on their behalf? They could certainly try to 
argue this, but it would not be a plausible view. The thick relation is created between the 
robot and the end user, i.e. the one with whom the robot shares experiences, signals affection 
and builds a shared relationship narrative. The original manufacturers and designers are 
outsiders to the thick relation. There is, of course, some messiness to this ideal of thick 
relations between humans and robots. A robot could be in a thick relation with many end 
users and owe them all duties of loyalty. Sometimes those duties might conflict. But this is no 
different from a human who has more than one friend. The ethical norms are the same: you 
should not betray your thick relations to others or to one another.   
 
Second, thick relations aren’t the only relations that invoke special duties of loyalty. 
There are some purely professional and contractual relationships that give rise to such duties. 
In law, these are termed fiduciary relationships and classic examples would include lawyer-
client, trustee-beneficiary and director-company relationships. It is possible that robots could 
take on such professional fiduciary roles and thus either they or their controllers and 
manufacturers could be bound by those special duties of loyalty. This might be a way of 
gaining special protection against robotic deception without making assumptions about the 
thick relations we could share with robots. This could work well in some cases but it is worth 
bearing in mind that (a) at present these relationships only cover a narrow range of 
professional interactions and would have to be extended to cover all the cases of human-robot 
interactions we might want to have special protections for; and (b) limiting special 
protections to these cases overlooks the potential benefits of welcoming robots into the world 




Robotic deception is an ethical concern, but it is important to think clearly about its 
different possible forms. This article has tried to facilitate clear thinking by arguing that there 
are three distinct high-level forms of robotic deception -- external state deception, superficial 
state deception and hidden state deception – the latter two of which pose unique philosophical 
and ethical challenges in the robotic case. It has argued, in turn, that the second form of 
deception, superficial state deception, is not best thought of as a form of deception at all, and 
that the third form of deception is best thought of as a form of betrayal. While these three 
arguments enable us to see the distinctive harms that might be involved in cases of robotic 
deception, they leave plenty of questions left to be answered. For example, how exactly can 
we protect against robotic betrayal in practical terms? Could it be that we are just too 
vulnerable to such betrayal to allow for the use and manufacture of social robots? These are 
important topics for another day. 
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